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following lines: there were an even number of stars in the universe on
July 4, 1976 at twelve noon, Eastern Daylight Savings Time.
But "skeptical theists" have not answered all nagging questions. This is
evident in even the most explicit statement of "modal skepticisml!-van
Inwagen's: "If the subject matter of p is remote from the concerns of everyday life, then our ordinary powers of 'modalization' are not reliable guides
to the modal status of pI! (p. 237). This principle is not entirely helpful
because van Inwagen himself so easily generates a counterexample: "We
certainly know the modal status of 'If God exists, then there is an immaterial being' and the 'subject matter' of this proposition is, no doubt, remote
from the concerns of everyday life" (p. 237). So one is still left wondering
which modal judgments "removed from everyday life" are justified and
which ones aren't. Now I am not suggesting that no Chisholming can save
this formulation; nor did I intimate that the atheist cannot show that the
standards employed by theists lead to an objectionable version of skepticism. I am simply pointing to an area that deserves further philosophical
exploration, as do many of the other topics broached in this volume.
In many ways, this collection portrays philosophy at its best (though the
exchange between van Inwagen and Gale is a bit acrimonious); it shows
philosophers from differing perspectives coming together to make progress
on a specific issue. A pleasant benefit is that this volume, unlike many other
anthologies, for the most part has the feel of a genuine philosophical conversation. In the course of this conversation, members from both camps graciously concede that their previous formulations need various repairs and
they attempt to reformulate them to avoid these defects. Perhaps most
importantly, this conversation features some of the most important ,"Titers
in the field offering new perspectives and arguments. Although I am not a
prophet, I suspect that some of these new arguments will soon become a reference point for many debates on evil and the existence of God. For putting
such a resource at our fingertips, we are all indebted to the authors whose
work is collected here and especially the" collector" himself: Daniel HowardSnyder.2
NOTES
1. Stump's reprinted essay brings the total of reprinted articles to six
(not five-oops!-as the cover states).
2. I wish to thank Daniel Howard-Snyder and Philip L. Quinn for some
comments on previous drafts of this review. Any errors that remain are, of
course, my responsibility and from them one may conclusively infer that I
am neither omniscient, omnipotent nor omnibenevolent.

The Concept of Faith: A Philosophical Investigation, by William Lad
Sessions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. 298 pp.
GEORGE MAVRODES, University of Michigan
This book is an unusually provocative and suggestive contribution to the
recent literature in the philosophy of religion. It undertakes to explore the
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way in which faith is thought of across a wide range of religious traditions.
Sessions has made his own Shldy of these traditions-seven examples chosen from Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism-and he has illuminating
observations to make about them. But for many of us the greatest value of
the book will be that of providing a suggestive framework within which
we ourselves can more profitably reflect on the religions which we want to
understand better-whether that is our own religion looked at from the
inside or some other religion seen from the outside.
The book involves three main pieces of analytic machinery. The first
is the concept of faith itself. Sessions wants to apply this idea to a wide
range of religions, and he argues that for this purpose it cannot usefully
be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. It has to be construed instead as a "family resemblance" concept
(as in Wittgenstein), one whose unity is generated by a somewhat vague
collection of features which are manifested to varying degrees and in
various combinations by the particular cases which fall under it. It is
this over-arching concept (Sessions sometimes calls it an "analogical"
concept) which constitutes the subject of the book.
Then there are the several conceptions of faith, the various ways in which
faith is construed in the actual religions. Sessions discusses seven exampies-Thomistic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Contemporary Reconstructive,
Tripartite Hindu, Shin Buddhist, and Son Buddhist. But he elects to deal
not with the vague and inchoate ideas of the ordinary practitioners of the
religions, but instead with the conceptions as they have been refined by
reflective thinkers within those traditions. And in practice Sessions usually
selects one such thinker for each tradition (e.g., Josef Pieper for Thomistic
Christianity). These conceptions are much more sharply defined than the
overall concept of faith. They are the family members whose various
resemblances to each other constitute whatever unity there is within the
big family of faith.
Between these come six models of faith. The models are not themselves elements in the religious traditions, nor usually in the conceptual
armament of even the reflective thinkers in those religions. They are
Sessions' own analytic contribution to this project. Each model is constituted by elements which Sessions finds to be important in the various
conceptions. Each of these models-Personal Relationship, Belief,
Attitude, Confidence, Devotion, and Hope-consists of a set of features
which Sessions claims hang together in some strong way. The models
are intended to have a genuine internal unity and coherence, rather than
being sets of features stipulated in some arbitrary and ad hoc way. Each
modet therefore, constitutes a natural constellation. Or, we might say, it
identifies a "natural kind" of faith. Sessions thinks of his own apprehension of these models as being more like a discovery than like an invention. They are something like Platonic ideal forms, ideal forms for the
varieties of faith.
The largest part of the book is taken up with a discussion of the models and their relation to each other, and then in applying the models to
the seven actual religious conceptions, as these conceptions are developed by the chosen exponents. These discussions are too involved to be
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summarized here. But readers will soon note that the various actual
conceptions are often found to involve elements from two or more models, rather than exemplifying one model in its pure form. We might, of
course, take that to be just one more way in which this sorry world falls
short of the ideal. But we might instead consider the possibility that the
models as they stand are not ideal for any robust human faith-they are
perhaps too abstract, too spare, somehow not rich enough to capture the
reality of a living faith.
My last comment concerns the overall topic of the book. Is it really
about faith? In a way, of course, this is "a question about words," and
maybe it is merely (in the tendentious sense) about words. Or maybe
not. It seems to me that Sessions is right in thinking that we have need
of family-resemblance concepts. But just as everything is different from
everything else, it is also true that everything resembles everything else
in some way and to some extent. As the degree of resemblance is attenuated the "family" defined by that resemblance becomes more inclusive.
But the utility of considering it to be one family probably also diminishes. For the purposes of thought, we need conceptual exclusions as well
as inclusions, contrasts as well as similarities.
Perhaps we should consider saying that religions generally-perhaps
universally(?)-include some intentional, conceptual, psychological elements which are enjoined, or recommended, or nurtured among the
practitioners of that religion. To be religious-i.e., to be an adherent and
practitioner of some particular religion-is, in part, to think, feel, believe,
expect, hope, etc., in a certain way. Of course, there are very few religions-probably none at all-in which the religious life consists entirely
of psychological elements. But characteristically such elements are a part
of the patterns of life which are nurtured by the various religions. A
work such as this one could then be construed as exploring the variety of
such elements in the various religions, without a commitment-initially,
at least-as to whether all of these elements are best identified as faith.
And that reserve would, I suppose, be most appropriate in the case of
religions which are usually expounded in languages other than English,
so that there is a real question as to whether the crucial terms their own
exponents use are best translated into English as "faith."
Furthermore, if we do not begin with the "faith" terminology we
might be more comfortable in exploring the question of whether, and
how, some apparently non-religious patterns of life involve significantly
similar constellations of psychological, intentional elements.

